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Abstract
A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian
anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage
game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from
one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their
power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within
its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can
pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages
between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and
farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.
JEL Classication Numbers: C71, D74, R19
Keywords: allocation by force, coalitional games, pillage game, spatial re-
striction, stable set, farsighted core
1 Introduction
Hobbesian anarchy is a societal state prior to the formation of a government that
ensures property rights. Without such an organization, no individuals are safe to
secure their wealth. Individuals could be tempted to pillage others whenever possible
and benecial. Although a coalition could be formed to secure their wealth, some
members of the coalition may still be tempted to betray others and to take their
wealth. Consequently, in Hobbesian anarchy, the possibility of the stable distribution
of wealth is questionable.
A substantial amount of literature on allocation by force has been devoted to
this possibility. Skaperdas (1992) showed that a cooperative outcome is possible in
equilibrium if the probability of winning in conict is su¢ ciently robust against each
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individuals action. Hirshleifer (1995) found the conditions under which Hobbesian
anarchy is stable. Also, Hirshleifer (1991), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), andMuthoo
(1991) studied the situations in which property right is partially secured. These
studies analyzed noncooperative models in which the formation of coalitions is limited
or not allowed.
In contrast to the previous models, Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) and Jordan
(2006) developed models of Hobbesian anarchy that allow the formation of coalitions.
Piccione and Rubinstein introduced the jungle in which coercion governs economic
transactions and they compared the equilibrium allocation of the jungle with the
equilibrium allocation of an exchange economy. Jordan introduced pillage games
and examined stable sets of allocations in which the power of pillaging balances
endogenously.
The spatial pillage game is an extended version of a pillage game. In most literature
on allocation by forceincluding the papers reviewed above, there is no restriction
on using power. Thus any individual or coalitions can pillage another individual or
other coalitions if one is more powerful than others. However, the acts of pillaging
and defending are inevitably under spatial restriction. Members of a coalition, if they
move together, cannot simultaneously pillage two less powerful coalitions that are far
apart from each other. Likewise, two coalitions cannot combine their power to defend
themselves together against another powerful coalition unless they are close enough
to each other. The spatial pillage game introduces a space feature, which conditions
power usage based on location, into a Hobbesian anarchy model that allows the
formation of coalitions, in the hope of understanding how spatial restriction a¤ects
stable distributions of wealth.
The spatial pillage game internalizes the space feature through the following as-
sumptions. There are regions and each player can stay in only one of the regions.
Players can change their regions to pillage others. The regions are connected with one
another, and thus players can travel from a region to another in one move. Players
can form a coalition and combine their power only after getting together in a com-
mon region. If coalitions are in di¤erent regions, they cannot combine their power.
The inuence of the power of each coalition is limited within its region. Therefore, a
coalition cannot pillage two other coalitions in di¤erent regions simultaneously.
The other assumptions in this spatial pillage game are the same as in the original
pillage games. A xed amount of wealth is allocated among a nite number of players.
Some players can form a coalition under the spatial restriction. A coalition can pillage
less powerful coalitions within its region without any cost. An increase in the wealth
of a coalition causes an increase in its power. Since the power of each coalition
is endogenously determined, the spatial pillage game cannot have a characteristic
function, which exogenously determines the power of each coalition.
The pillage games are characterized by power functions that determine the feasi-
bility of pillages between coalitions. Jordan (2006) presented three power functions
classied by the degree of their dependence on the sizes of coalitions. Wealth is
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power is one of the power functions and species the power of each coalition as its
total wealth. Therefore, wealth is power is characterized as independent of the
sizes of coalitions. Only the pillage game with this power function has a stable set in
every possible case. Therefore, the spatial pillage game adopts wealth is poweras
a power function so that if there exists solutions in this spatial pillage game, then we
can compare it with the solutions in the original pillage game and can nd how the
spatial restriction a¤ects a stable distribution of wealth.
As criteria for stable distributions of wealth and players, three solution concepts
are explored; core, stable set, and farsighted core. First, the core is the collection of
states at which pillage is not possible, thus it is one of the most persuasive solution
concepts. However, due to its strong requirement, the core is too small to represent
stable states as shown in Theorem 1. Second, a stable set is much bigger than the core
if it exists, as shown in Theorem 3. A stable set is a collection of states that is both
internally stable and externally stable. Internal stability requires that pillage not be
possible between states in the collection and external stability requires that pillage
at a state outside the collection result in another state inside the collection. In most
cases, however, no stable set exists as shown in Theorem 4. Even when they exist,
they contain implausible states as shown in Theorem 3. Third, farsighted core, which
was introduced by Jordan (2006), solves these problems with stable sets, as shown in
Theorem 5. A farsighted core accepts the assumption that a player has a forecasting
ability and is dened as a collection of states at which pillage in expectation is not
possible in the sense that some members of the pillage would end up being worse o¤,
and consequently they would not join the pillage.
In section 2, we search for the core and stable sets. First, the core is characterized.
In N region model where N  2, as N increases, the size of the core grows. So, the
core in N region model for N  3 is greater than the core in Jordans model, which
can be considered as a one-region model. This is because as the number of the regions
increases, the feasibility of pillages is more limited under the spatial restriction. As
a result, the set of states at which pillage is not possible grows. Next, a stable set
is studied. A stable set, if it exists, is much bigger than the stable set in Jordans
model and does not show an endogenous balance with respect to the pillaging power
as the stable set in Jordans model does. This is because the limited feasibility of
the pillages under the spatial restriction makes the conditions of the stable set, both
internal stability and external stability, improper to be requirements for a reasonable
solution to the spatial pillage game.
In section 3, we nd that there exists the unique farsighted core. This farsighted
core is similar to the farsighted core in Jordans model. So, the farsighted core
represents stable distributions of wealth, which shows an endogenous balance with
respect to the pillaging power, as the farsighted core in Jordans model does. Since
Jordans model does not include the spatial concept and induces the result similar to
the one in this spatial pillage game, we concluded that if players have the forecasting
ability, then the stable distributions of wealth does not change under the spatial
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restriction.
In section 4, a suggestion for further research is presented.
2 Core and stable set
The environment of a spatial pillage game is dened in Denitions 1 and 2. We
normalize the total wealth to unity.
Denition 1 1The nite set I is the set of players. A coalition is a subset of
I. The set A = fw 2 RI : wi  0 for all i 2 I and
P
z2I wz = 1g is the set of
allocations.
The denitions below concern the spatial environment.
Denition 2 The nite set R is the set of regions and the Cartesian product RI is
the set of distributions. Given a distribution p 2 RI , the coalition pr = fi 2 I :
pi = rg is the population at region r.
A distribution is short for a population distribution and denotes how players are
distributed over the regions. For example, the distribution p = (1; 1; 2) expresses that
players 1 and 2 are at region 1 and player 3 is at region 2. Also, it means p1 = f1; 2g
and p2 = f3g.
A state denotes both the allocation and distribution of the status quo.
Denition 3 The Cartesian product X = ARI is the set of states.
For instance, the ordered pair (w; p) = ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 2)) is a state in the three-
player and two-region model. The state (w; p) expresses that player 1 has 1
2
and
player 2 has 1
4
while staying at region 1 and player 3 has 1
4
while staying at region 2.
The dominance relation between states is dened as follows.
Denition 4 Given states (w; p) and (w0; p0), dene W = fi : w0i > wig and L =
fi : w0i < wig. Suppose for some r; q 2 R, i) fi : w0i 6= wig  p0r; ii) fi : pi 6= p0ig = ?
or fi : pi 6= p0ig = W  pq; and iii)
P
i2W wi >
P
i2Lwi. Then (w
0; p0) dominates
(w; p).
The dominance relation shows the states to which the status quo can move. It
must satisfy both physical and spatial conditions. The physical condition requires
that the winning coalition W have enough power to pillage the losing coalition L.
Denition 4 presents this condition at iii). Jordan (2006) introduced a variety of
physical conditions. The condition iii) above accords with the physical condition
of the wealth is power in Jordan (2006). The spatial condition requires that the
1I follow notations in Jordan (2006).
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act of pillaging satisfy spatial restriction. This condition is expressed at i) and ii)
in Denition 4. The condition i) means that transfers of wealth happen only in
destination region r where the pillage happens. The condition ii) denotes that only
the winners can travel and that they are all from the common region q. That is,
the spatial restriction in dominance relation is that W can combine their power only
when they are in the common region, and once they combine their power, then they
can all together move to another region in order to pillage L.
This concept of spatial restriction is designed to reect the simplest way of forming
a coalition. This study intends to make an initial contribution to understand how
spatial restriction a¤ects stable distributions of wealth. So, as a starting point, this
study adopts the simplest feature of spatial restriction. An advanced concept of the
spatial restriction, which allows a complicated way of forming a coalition, will be
presented at the denition of Dominance in Expectation in section 3. Note that if
there is only one region, then this denition of dominance relation coincides with the
denition in Jordan (2006). So, this denition can be considered as a spatial version
of the Jordans denition.
In this section, we adopt the solution concepts of core and stable set. The
denition stated below follows Lucas (1992) and Jordan (2006).
Denition 5 The set of undominated states is the core C. For any set E of states,
let the set U(E) be the set of states that are not dominated by any state in E. A set S
of states is a stable set if it satises both S  U(S), which means internal stability,
and S  U(S), which means external stability.
Therefore, a stable set S is dened by the set of states that satises S = U(S).
Theorem 1 embodies the core.
Theorem 1 The set f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g is the
core C.
Proof. Suppose (w; p) 2 f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g. If
wi > 0, then wi  minf12 ; 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0gg. If
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g 
1
2
, then #fr 2 R :
j2prwj > 0g = 1 or 2 and thus for each i, wi = 1; 12 ; or 0. In this case, any coalition
W cannot pillage another coalition L such that W \ L = ? because if Pi2Lwi > 0,
then
P
i2Lwi  12 and so 12 
P
i=2Lwi 
P
i2W wi. If
1
2
> 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g , then
#fi : wi > 0g = #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g since #fi : wi > 0g  #fr 2 R : j2prwj >
0g and #fi : wi > 0g 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g = #fi : wi > 0gminf
1
2
; 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0gg 
i2Iwi = 1, and thus for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g or 0 since wi 
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g
or 0. In this case, we have for each r 2 R, j2prwj = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g or 0, and so
any coalition W such that W  pq for some q 2 R cannot pillage another coalition
L such that W \ L = ? because if Pi2Lwi > 0, then Pi2Lwi  1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g
and 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g 
P
i2W wi. Therefore, (w; p) is not dominated. Since (w; p) is
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arbitrary, every state in the set f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or
0g is not dominated.
Suppose (w; p) =2 f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g. Then
there exists i such that wi =2 f0; 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; 1g. If wi > 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ,
then there exists q 2 R such that 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > j2pqwj > 0 since j2Iwj = 1,
and thus player i can pillage another player j such that wj > 0 and pj = q since
wi >
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > k2pqwk  wj > 0. If #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g = 1
and wi < 1, then either 1 > wi > 12 or
1
2
> wi > 0 since wi =2 f12 ; 0g, and thus
player i can pillage player j such that wj > 0 or the coalition W = fk : k 6= i and
pk = pig can pillage player i. If #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g  2 and 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g >
wi, then
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , which denotes the average wealth of regions ex-
cept the region pi, is well dened, and thus either wi  j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig
or
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig > wi. If wi 
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , then j2ppiwj >
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , which means that the wealth of the region pi is greater than
the average wealth of regions except the region pi, since 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > wi 
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , and thus all players in the region pi can pillage another re-
gion q such that wi  j2pqwj > 0. If j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig > wi, then all players
in q such that j2pqwj  j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig can pillage the player i. This means
that (w; p) is dominated by some state in X. Since (w; p) is arbitrary, every state in
X n f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g is dominated.
Theorem 1 shows how the core changes under the spatial restriction. If there are
less than three regions, then we have C = f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1; 12 ; or 0g
which is the core in Jordan (2006). However, if there are three regions or more, then
we have the greater core C = f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g.
This greater core results from the limited feasibility of the dominance relation under
the spatial restriction so that in some specic population distributions, no pillaging
movement is feasible.
2.1 Stable set in three-player models
To characterize stable sets, we divide states into four groups according to their distri-
butions and allocations; group 1) all players are in one region; group 2) players have
less than halves and occupy two regions; group 3) only one player has a half or more
and the player stays alone in his region; and group 4) only one player has a half or
more and the player is together with only another player in his region. It is easy to
analyze the states in groups 1), 2), and 3) to nd a stable set; it is relatively hard in
group 4), however. Thus we would devote most of this subsection to analyzing the
states in group 4). For simplicity of expression, we call a state in group 4) a basic
6
Figure 1: Basic Sets
state and a set of basic states a basic set.
Denition 6 formalizes a basic set and a basic state.
Denition 6 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, dene the set B(i; j; k) of
distributions by B(i; j; k) = fp 2 RI : for some region r 2 R, pr = fi; jg or fi; kg g
and dene the correspondence Bij;k : [
1
2
; 1]  RI  ! ! X by Bij;k(a; _p) = f(w; p) 2
X : p = _p, wi  a, and wi + wj + wk = 1g. For each p 2 B(i; j; k), the set Bij;k(12 ; p)
of states is called a basic set. A state in a basic set is called a basic state.
The set B(i; j; k) denotes the set of distributions such that either player i and
player j, or player i and player k constitute all population in some region. For
example, let p = (1; 1; 2) and p0 = (1; 2; 1), then p; p0 2 B(1; 2; 3) because player 1
shares region 1 only with player 2 at the distribution p and only with player 3 at the
distribution p0. The basic sets are visualized on the hyperplane of states in Figure
1. The black area and the gray area denote the basic set B12;3(
1
2
; (1; 1; 2)) and the
basic set B21;3(
1
2
; (1; 1; 2)), respectively. They are all possible basic sets under the
distribution (1; 1; 2).
In Figure 1, consider the basic state (w; p) = (( 7
12
; 3
12
; 1
6
); (1; 1; 2)) where players 1
has 7
12
and player 2 has 3
12
while staying at region 1 and player 3 has 1
6
while staying
at region 2. Note that player 1 cannot pillage players 2 and 3 simultaneously because
players 2 and 3 are in di¤erent regions. If player 1 pillages player 3 at (w; p), then the
allocation of the state is located on the left arrow in the gure, and the distribution
changes from (1; 1; 2) to (2; 1; 2). If player 1 pillages player 2 at (w; p), then the state
is located on the right arrow, and the distribution does not change.
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Figure 2: The Set H12;3(
7
12
; (1; 1; 2))
For notational simplicity, we dene the following set of states.
Denition 7 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, dene the correspondence
H ij;k : [
1
2
; 1]  RI  ! ! X by H ij;k(a; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p, wi = a, and
wi + wj + wk = 1g.
For each (a; p) 2 [1
2
; 1]RI , the setH ij;k(a; p) consists of the states such that wi = a
in Bij;k(
1
2
; p). In Figure 2, the bold horizontal line and the dot denote H ij;k(
7
12
; (1; 1; 2))
and w = ( 7
12
; 3
12
; 1
6
), respectively.
Denition 8 introduces the condition that a stable set has to satisfy. The condition
is related to basic sets, and thus we call this condition the basic condition. If a set
S 0 of states lacks the basic condition, then S 0 cannot simultaneously satisfy internal
stability and external stability.
Denition 8 Given a set E of states, for any two distinct states (w; p); ( _w; p) 2 E \
Bij;k(
1
2
; p) such that p 2 B(i; j; k) and 1 > _wi  wi > 12 , suppose that i) 0 < _wj  wj
and 0 < _wk  wk; and ii) _wk < wk when pi = pj and _wj < wj when pi = pk. Then
the set E of states is said to satisfy the basic condition.
We can prove that a stable set satises the basic condition by way of contradiction.
That is, if we assume that there is a stable set that lacks the basic condition, then
we can show that the stable set cannot satisfy internal stability and external stability
simultaneously.
Lemma 1 A stable set satises the basic condition.
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Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S that does
not satisfy the basic condition. Then for some three distinct players i; j; and k,
there exist two distinct states (w; p); ( _w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) such that p 2 B(i; j; k);
1 > _wi  wi > 12 ; if pi = pk, then _wk > wk or _wj  wj; and if pi = pj, then _wk  wk
or _wj > wj. Without loss of generality, we can assume that player i is together with
player j in a common region, i.e. pi = pj. Then we must have that either _wk  wk
or _wj > wj. We can show that in each case, S cannot satisfy internal stability and
external stability simultaneously.
Suppose that we have _wk  wk. We rst show that _wk > wk. Every state ( w; p)
in Bij;k(
1
2
; p) such that wk = wk and wi = wi has wj = wj since wi + wj + wk =
wi + wj + wk = 1. Thus we have that ( w; p) = (w; p). Therefore, ( _w; p) cannot have
_wk = wk and _wi = wi since (w; p) 6= ( _w; p). Every state (...w; p) in Bij;k(12 ; p) such that...
wk = wk and
...
wi > wi is the state that results from player i pillaging player j at
the state (w; p); that is, such state (
...
w; p) dominates (w; p). By internal stability, S
cannot contain such state (
...
w; p) and thus ( _w; p) cannot be _wk = wk and _wi > wi.
Therefore, we must have that _wk 6= wk and thus that _wk > wk.
Let the allocation w0 be w0j = _wj, w
0
k = wk, and w
0
i = 1   _wj   wk. Since
_wi  wi and _wk > wk, we have wj = 1   wi   wk > 1   _wi   _wk = _wj. Thus
we have w0i = 1   _wj   wk > 1   wj   wk = wi. Since w0k = wk, w0i > wi, and
w0j = _wj = 1 wk w0i = wj  (w0i wi), (w0; p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging
player j. Thus S cannot contain (w0; p) according to internal stability. To satisfy
external stability, S has to dominate (w0; p).
However, we can show that S cannot dominate (w0; p). The stable set S can
dominate (w0; p), only if S contains those states as follows; the states that result from
player i pillaging player j at (w0; p), the states that result from player i pillaging
player k at (w0; p), the states that result from players i and j pillaging player k at
(w0; p), the states that result from player j pillaging player k at (w0; p) when w0j > w
0
k,
or the states that result from player k pillaging player j at (w0; p) when w0k > w
0
j.
Note that player j and player k are in di¤erent regions and so player i cannot pillage
both of them simultaneously although player i has enough power to do it, i.e. pj 6= pk
and w0i > w
0
j + w
0
k. We will show that S cannot contain any state above.
Every state that results from player i pillaging player j at (w0; p) dominates (w; p),
which is in S according to our assumption. By internal stability, S cannot contain
those states. Every state that results from player i pillaging player k at (w0; p) domi-
nates ( _w; p), which is in S according to our assumption. Similarly, S cannot contain
those states. The states that result from players i and j pillaging player k at (w0; p)
are all dominated by ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pk; :::; pk)), which is in the core. Thus S
cannot contain those states. The states that result from player j pillaging player k
at (w0; p) or that result from player k pillaging player j at (w0; p) are all dominated
by either ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pk; :::; pk)) or ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pj; :::; pj)). Thus S
cannot contain those states. Therefore, S cannot dominate (w0; p) and thus cannot
satisfy external stability. This contradiction shows that _wk  wk is not possible.
9
Suppose that we have that _wj > wj. Then we can similarly show that S cannot
dominate the state (w00; p) such that w00j = wj, w
00
k = _wk, and w
00
i = 1   wj   _wk.
Consequently, the stable set S cannot satisfy internal stability and external stability
simultaneously. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 2 presents another condition that a stable set must follow. Lemma 1
examines the relation between two basic states in a stable set. Lemma 2 examines
the relation between a basic state and another state whose distribution results from
the move of the player who has a half or more at the basic state.
Lemma 2 Suppose that p 2 B(i; j; k) and (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Let a distribution
_p satisfy that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and _pi 2 fpj; pkg. Given a stable set S, if
(w; _p) 2 S, then (w; p) 2 S.
Proof. If _pi = pi 2 fpj; pkg, then _p = p, and thus this result obviously follows. Now,
we have to show that if _pi 6= pi and (w; _p) 2 S, then (w; p) 2 S. Suppose by way of
contradiction that _pi 6= pi and (w; _p) 2 S, but (w; p) =2 S. It su¢ ces to show that S
cannot contain any state that dominates (w; p).
Without loss of generality, we assume that wj  wk. Since (w; _p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; _p),
we have that wi  12 and wi + wj + wk = 1. We rst show that if wj > wk then
wj+wk <
1
2
. By way of contradiction, suppose not, that is, wj > wk and wj+wk = 12 .
Then (w; _p) is dominated by the state ( w; p) such that wi = wj = 12 , which is in the
core, C, by player j pillaging all wealth of player k at (w; _p). This contradicts internal
stability of S since (w; _p) 2 S and C  S.
Let (w0; p0) result from player j or players i and j pillaging player k at (w; p).
Then we have p0j = p
0
k. If players i and j pillage player k at (w; _p), then w
0
i > wi  12
and w0j > 0, and thus player i can deprive the other players of their all wealth by
pillage since p0j = p
0
k and w
0
j + w
0
k < w
0
i. If player j alone pillages player k at (w; _p),
then wj > wk and thus w0i = wi >
1
2
since wj+wk < 12 . Thus player i can also deprive
the other players of their all wealth in one move since p0j = p
0
k and w
0
j + w
0
k < w
0
i.
Therefore, (w0; p0) is dominated by some state ( _w0; _p0) in the core such that _w0i = 1,
and thus S cannot contain (w0; p0). Similarly, we can show that S cannot contain any
state that results from players i and k pillaging player j at (w; p).
Let (w00; p00) result from player i pillaging player j at (w; p). Then we have that
w00i > wi, w
00
j < wj, and w
00
z = wz for each z 2 I n fi; jg. Note that fz : p00z 6= pzg  fig
and thus fz : p00z 6= _pzg  fig since _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Therefore, (w00; p00)
dominates (w; _p) by player i pillaging player j. Thus S cannot contain (w00; p00).
Similarly, we can show that S cannot contain any state that results from player i
pillaging player k at (w; p).
Consequently, S cannot contain any state that dominates ( _w; p) and thus cannot
satisfy external stability. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 3 shows another implication of Lemmas 1 and 2. We will express basic
states in a stable set with a function. Lemma 3 provides a basis to dene the function
that characterizes a stable set.
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Lemma 3 Given a stable set S, S\H ij;k(a; p) has a single element for each 1  a > 12
and p 2 B(i; j; k).
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that for each 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k), S \H ij;k(a; p)
has a single element because H ij;k(1; p) has only one state regardless of p, which is
in the core and so in a stable set. Suppose that (w0; p); (w; p) 2 S \ H ij;k(a; p) such
that 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k). Then we have that (w0; p); (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)
and 1 > w0i = wi >
1
2
. Suppose by way of contradiction that w0 6= w. By the basic
condition of S, we have that either w0j  wj and w0k < wk, or w0j < wj and w0k  wk
since 1 > w0i  wi > 12 . However, neither case is possible since w0i + w0j + w0k =
wi + wj + wk. Therefore, we must have that w0 = w, and thus S \H ij;k(a; p) has at
most one state for each 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k).
We need to show that S \H ij;k(a; p) 6= ? for each 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k) to
complete the proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S
such that S \H ij;k(a; p) = ? for some 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that player i is together with player j in a common region,
i.e. pi = pj. Let wj = supfwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p)g and wk = supfwk : (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(a; p)g.
We rst show that a + wj + wk  1. Suppose by way of contradiction that
a + wj + wk > 1. Then by the denitions of wj and wk, there exist states ( _w; p)
and ( w; p) such that ( _w; p); ( w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p) and a + _wj + wk > 1. Since
( _w; p); ( w; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p), we have that _wi; wi  a and thus that _wi + _wj + wk > 1
and wi+ _wj + wk > 1. Thus we have that _wj > wj and _wk < wk since _wi+ _wj + _wk =
wi + wj + wk = 1. However, the basic condition of S implies that both _wj  wj and
_wk  wk if _wi  wi and both _wj  wj and _wk  wk if _wi  wi. This contradiction
guarantees that a+ wj + wk  1.
Dene the allocation w to be wi = a, wj = wj +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
, and wk = wk +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
. Then S cannot contain (w; p) since (w; p) 2 H ij;k(a; p) and S\H ij;k(a; p) =
?. To prove that the assertion, S \H ij;k(a; p) = ?, is impossible, it su¢ ces to show
that S cannot dominate (w; p).
First, we show that every state that results from player i pillaging player j at
(w; p) cannot be in S. Let the state (w0; p) result from player i pillaging player j
at (w; p). Then we have that w0i > a, w
0
j < wj, w
0
k = wk, and (w
0; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p);
that is, player i increases its wealth through pillaging player j at the state (w; p) and
player k maintains its wealth because the pillage does not a¤ect player k0s wealth. If
1 > ( wj + wk+ a) then w0k > wk, and thus (w
0; p) =2 S because wk is the supremum of
the wealth that player k can have at states in S \ Bij;k(a; p) and (w0; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p).
If 1 = wj + wk + a, then w0j < wj = wj and w
0
k = wk = wk. Thus there exists a state
(w00; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p) such that w0j < w00j  wj and w00k  wk by the denitions of
wj and wk. Thus if (w0; p) 2 S, then the basic condition of S means that w00i < w0i
since w0j < w
00
j and so that w
0
k < w
00
k . Since w
00
k  wk = w0k, we have that (w0; p) =2 S.
Note that (w0; p) is arbitrary such that (w0; p) results from player i pillaging player j
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at (w; p). Therefore, S cannot contain the states that result from player i pillaging
player j at (w; p).
Second, we prove that every state that results from player i pillaging player k
at (w; p) cannot be in S. Suppose by way of contradiction that S contains a state
(w000; p0) that results from player i pillaging player k at (w; p). Then we have that
w000i > wi, w
000
k < wk, and w
000
j = wj. Consider the state (w
000; p). Then we have
that p 2 B(i; j; k) and p0z = pz for each z 6= i and p0i = pk. Lemma 2 means that
(w000; p) 2 S \Bij;k(a; p) since (w000; p0) 2 S. Then we have that wj  w000j according to
the denition of wj. Since w000j = wj = wj +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
 wj, we have that w000j = wj
and thus that 1 = a+ wj+ wk. By the denition of wk, there exists (w(4); p) such that
(w(4); p) 2 S \Bij;k(a; p) and w000k < w(4)k < wk = wk. The basic condition of S implies
that w000j  w(4)j since w000k < w(4)k . Since w(4)j  wj = w000j according to the denition
of wj, we have that w000j = w
(4)
j . Therefore, we have that w
000
i > w
(4)
i , w
000
k < w
(4)
k , and
w000j = w
(4)
j . This means that (w
000; p0) dominates (w(4); p) by player i pillaging player k
at (w(4); p). This contradiction assures that (w000; p0) =2 S. Since (w000; p0) is arbitrary,
S cannot contain the states that result from player i pillaging player k at (w; p).
Finally, we demonstrate that every state that dominates (w; p) and that is not
covered by the two cases above is not in S. Note that these states result from either
player j or player k moving to the other regardless of the move of player i. Conse-
quently, player j and player k are in a common region at these states. Therefore, all
such states are dominated by some state in the core such that player i has all of the
wealth because player i, who has a majority of the power, wi  a > 12 , can pillage
both players in one move. Therefore, S cannot contain these states.
Consequently, S cannot dominate (w; p). This means that S cannot satisfy in-
ternal stability and external stability simultaneously. This contradiction guarantees
that we must have that S \H ij;k(a; p) 6= ? for each 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k).
Denition 9 presents the conditions for the function that characterizes a stable
set and names the function a basic function.
Denition 9 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, let a function ij;k : [0;
1
2
] 
B(i; j; k)  ! [0; 1
2
] satisfy that ij;k(; p)   for each (; p) 2 [0; 12 ]  B(i; j; k).
Dene the set B(ij;k) of states by B(
i
j;k) = f(w; p) 2
S
p2B(i;j;k)B
i
j;k(
1
2
; p) : for some
(; p) 2 [0; 1
2
]  B(i; j; k), wj = ij;k(; p) and wk =    ij;k(; p)g. Suppose that
ij;k satises the following three conditions; i) B(
i
j;k) satises the basic condition;
ii) if p; _p 2 B(i; j; k) satisfy that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and pi 6= _pi, then for each
 2 [0; 1
2
], ij;k(; p) = 
i
j;k(; _p); and for each p 2 B(i; j; k), iii) if lim
!1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
,
then ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
, otherwise ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
2
. Then ij;k is called a basic function.
Lemma 4 characterizes the functions that generate the set satisfying the basic
condition.
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Lemma 4 Let a function ij;k be a function from [0;
1
2
]  B(i; j; k) to [0; 1
2
] such
that ij;k(; p)   for each (; p) 2 [0; 12 ]  B(i; j; k). If B(ij;k) satises the basic
condition, then ij;k(; p) is uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 12).
Proof. If B(ij;k) satises the basic condition, then for each
1
2
>  > 0  0 and
p 2 B(i; j; k), we have that   ij;k(; p)  0  ij;k(0; p) and ij;k(; p)  ij;k(0; p).
Therefore, Given any " > 0, we must have that " > ij;k(; p)  ij;k(0; p)  0 for all
; 0 2 [0; 1
2
) and p 2 B(i; j; k) such that " >  0  0. This shows that the function
ij;k(; p) is uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 12).
Corollary 1 shows properties of a basic function.
Corollary 1 For each p 2 B(i; j; k), a basic function ij;k(; p) : [0; 12 ] ! [0; 12 ] is
uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 1
2
).
Proof. According to Lemma 4, this result follows.
Lemma 5 strengthens Lemma 1. More concretely, Lemma 5 shows that a stable
set must satisfy three conditions that are reected on a basic function.
Lemma 5 Given a stable set S, for any three distinct players i; j; and k, there exists
a unique basic function ij;k such that (B(
i
j;k) [ C) \ Bij;k(12 ; p) = S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) for
each p 2 B(i; j; k).
Proof. According to Lemma 3, S\H ij;k(a; p) has a single state for each 1  a > 12 and
p 2 B(i; j; k). In addition, we have that S\H ij;k(12 ; p) 6= ? for each p 2 B(i; j; k) since
such a set contains some states in C, at which two players have halves. Therefore, we
can dene the function  : [1
2
; 1]B(i; j; k)! [0; 1
2
] as follows; i) (wi; p) = wj such
that (w; p) 2 S \ Sp2B(i;j;k)Bij;k(12 ; p); and for each p 2 B(i; j; k), ii) if there exists
(w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) such that wi = 12 and wj = 14 , then (12 ; p) = 14 , otherwise
(1
2
; p) = 1
2
. That is, the function  assigns each (wi; p) the player j0s allocation
according to (w; p) 2 S \Sp2B(i;j;k)Bij;k(12 ; p).
Dene the function ij;k : [0;
1
2
]  B(i; j; k) ! [0; 1
2
] by ij;k(; p) = (1   ; p).
Then it is easily seen that for each (; p) 2 [0; 1
2
]  B(i; j; k), ij;k(; p)   and
((B(ij;k) [ C) \ Bij;k(12 ; p)) n H ij;k(12 ; p) = (S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)) n H ij;k(12 ; p). Next, we will
show that for each p 2 B(i; j; k), (B(ij;k) [ C) \H ij;k(12 ; p) = S \H ij;k(12 ; p).
By the denition of ij;k, we have that B(
i
j;k)  S and thus that (B(ij;k) [C) \
H ij;k(
1
2
; p)  S\H ij;k(12 ; p) for each p 2 B(i; j; k). Note that if (w0; p) 2 H ij;k(12 ; p) with
w0j =2 f0; 14 ; 12g, then (w0; p) is dominated by some state in C such that two players
have halves. Therefore, if (w; p) 2 S \H ij;k(12 ; p) for some p 2 B(i; j; k), then wj = 0,
1
4
, or 1
2
. And thus (w; p) 2 (B(ij;k) [ C) \ H ij;k(12 ; p) because if wj = 0 or 12 then
(w; p) 2 C and if wj = 14 then (w; p) 2 B(ij;k).
To complete the proof, we must show that the function ij;k is a basic function.
Since (B(ij;k)[C)\Bij;k(12 ; p) = S \Bij;k(12 ; p) for each p 2 B(i; j; k), the set B(ij;k)
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satises the basic condition as S does by Lemma 1. If p; _p 2 B(i; j; k) such that
_pz = pz for each z 6= i and pi 6= _pi, then S \ H ij;k(wi; p) = S \ H ij;k(wi; _p) for each
1  wi  12 by Lemma 2, and thus ij;k(; p) = ij;k(; _p) for each  2 [0; 12 ]. Now,
we only need to prove that lim
!1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
if and only if ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
because if
ij;k(
1
2
; p) 6= 1
4
, then S \H ij;k(12 ; p) has two elements at which player j has either 0 or
1
2
.
First, we prove that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), if ij;k(12 ; p) = 14 then limwi !1=2 
i
j;k(wi; p) =
1
4
. Suppose that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), there exists (w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p) with wi = 12
and wj = 14 . Without loss of generality, we assume that player i is together with player
j in a common region, i.e. pi = pj. Since 
i
j;k(; p) is uniformly continuous on [0; 12)
by Lemma 4, lim
wi !1=2
ij;k(wi; p) always exists. Let b = lim
wi !1=2
ij;k(wi; p). Suppose by
way of contradiction that b 6= 1
4
.
Let b > 1
4
rst. Then there exists _wi such that 
i
j;k(1  _wi; p) = 14 by the continuity
of ij;k(; p) on [0; 12), and thus there exists the allocation _w such that _wj = 14 and
( _w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p). Let _p 2 RI such that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and _pi = pk.
Then the state ( _w; _p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player k at (w; p) since
_wi > wi, _wk < wk, and _wj = wj. Thus we have that ( _w; _p) =2 S. However, every
state that results from player i pillaging either player j or player k at ( _w; _p) dominates
( _w; p) 2 S as well. Every state that results from either player j or player k moving his
region to pillage, regardless of the movement of player i, is dominated by some state
in the core such that player i has the entire wealth. Therefore, S cannot dominate
( _w; _p), and thus S lacks external stability.
Let b < 1
4
next. Then there exists  2 [0; 1
2
) with    ij;k(; p) > 14 , and thus
there exists 00 such that 00   ij;k(00; p) = 14 since ij;k(; p) is continuous on [0; 12).
Then there exists ( w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) with wk = 14 and wj = ij;k(00; p), and ( w; p)
dominates (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) by player i pillaging player j at (w; p). This shows
that S lacks internal stability. Consequently, these contradictions ensure that b = 1
4
.
Lastly, we prove that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), if lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
, then ij;k(
1
2
; p) =
1
4
. Suppose that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
. Note that (w; p) 2
Bij;k(
1
2
; p) with wi = 12 , wj =
1
4
, and pi = pj is dominated only either by player i
pillaging another player at (w; p), or by players i and j pillaging player k at (w; p).
Note that ij;k(; p) and  ij;k(; p) denote player j0s allocation and player k0s allo-
cation, respectively, when player i has 1   at the distribution p in the stable set S.
Because lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
, we have that lim
 !1=2
(  ij;k(; p)) = 14 . Therefore, the
basic condition implies that a state (w00; p) such that w00j <
1
4
and w00k =
1
4
is not in S.
Such a state (w00; p) results from player i pillaging player j at (w; p). Furthermore,
the basic condition implies that a state (w000; p) such that w000j =
1
4
and w000k <
1
4
is not
in S. By Lemma 2, S cannot contain such a state (w000; _p) that results from player
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i pillaging player k at (w; p). Finally, every state that results from players i and j
pillaging player k at (w; p) is dominated by some state in the core such that player
i has all of the wealth. Therefore, S must contain (w; p) to satisfy external stability,
and thus we have that ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
.
Jordan (2006) studied the pillage game of wealth is powerpower function with-
out spatial restriction and found the unique stable set, the set of dyadic allocations.
Denition 10 introduces a dyadic state and the set of dyadic states D. Theorem 2
establishes that the set D is the unique stable set in a one-region model. Note that
Denition 10 and Theorem 2 are adapted from Jordan (2006) for the spatial pillage
game.
Denition 10 An allocation w 2 A is dyadic if for each i, wi = 0 or (12)ki for some
nonnegative integer ki. A state (w; p) is dyadic if w is dyadic. The set D denotes
the set of dyadic states.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3.3 in Jordan, 2006) In a one-region model, the unique
stable set is D.
Lemma 6 reveals another implication of Theorem 2. It applies Theorem 2 to a
general model, which possibly can have more than one region.
Lemma 6 Dene the set X of states by X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R,P
i2pr wi = 0;
1
2
; or 1 and if for some region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some
player z, wz = 12g. Then D is the unique set that satises both internal stability and
external stability with respect to X. In addition, a stable set includes D \ X.
Proof. For any region r 2 R and any distribution _p 2 RI , dene the set X(r; _p)
of states by X(r; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p and Pi2 _pr wi = 1g. We rst show
that D \X(r; p) is the unique set that satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect to X(r; p). By Theorem 2, the unique stable set in a one-region
model is the set of dyadic states. Given a region r 2 R and a distribution p 2 RI ,
dene the function wr;p : X  ! [0; 1]#pr by wr;p(w; p)1 = wmin pr ; :::; wr;p(w; p)#pr =
wmax pr ; that is, wr;p projects from X onto allocations of players in the region r of the
distribution p. Then fwr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2 D \ X(r; p)g is the set of allocations of
dyadic states in the #pr-player one-region model, and thus it is the unique stable set
by Theorem 2 in this one-region model. Note that in a one-region model, dominance
relation between states is well dened without distributions. Thus it is easily seen
that (w0; p) 2 X(r; p) dominates (w; p) 2 X(r; p) if and only if wr;p(w0; p) dominates
wr;p(w; p) in the #pr-player one-region model; both mean that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz >P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz. Therefore, D \X(r; p) is the unique set that satises both internal
stability and external stability with respect to X(r; p) because fwr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2
D\X(r; p)g is the unique stable set of allocations in the#pr-player one-region model.
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For any region r 2 R, any distribution _p 2 RI , and any player z with _pz =2 _pr,
dene the set X(z; r; _p) of states by X(z; r; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p, Pi2 _pr wi = 12 ,
and wz = 12g. We secondly prove that D \X(z; r; p) is the unique set that satises
both internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p). Note that
(w0; p) 2 X(z; r; p) dominates (w; p) 2 X(z; r; p) if and only if 2wr;p(w0; p) dominates
2wr;p(w; p) in the #pr-player one-region model. It is easily seen that f2wr;p(w; p) :
(w; p) 2 D \ X(z; r; p)g is the set of allocations of dyadic states in the #pr-player
one-region model, and thus by Theorem 2, f2wr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2 D \ X(z; r; p)g is
the unique stable set. Therefore, D \X(z; r; p) is the unique set that satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p).
Third, we check that a state in X(r; p) can be dominated only by another state in
X(r; p). If (w; p) 2 X(r; p) is dominated by another state (w0; p0), then because the
coalition fi : w0i > wig  pr pillages the coalition fi : w0i < wig  pr within region r,
we have that pi = p0i = r for any i 2 fi : w0i 6= wig. Since the pillage does not a¤ect
the coalition fi : w0i = wig, we have that pi = p0i for any i 2 fi : w0i = wig. Since
p0 = p and p0i = r for each i 2 fi : w0i > 0g, we have that (w0; p0) 2 X(r; p).
Suppose that S  X is a set that satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect to X. We next demonstrate that S = D \ X. The set S must
dominate every state in X(r; p) n S. However, X(r; p) n S can be dominated only
by some state in X(r; p), and thus S \ X(r; p) dominates every state in X(r; p) n
S. Since S \ X(r; p) is internally stable, S \ X(r; p) is a set that satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X(r; p). Therefore, we have
that S \ X(r; p) = D \ X(r; p). Since r and p are arbitrary, we have that S \S
(r;p)2RRI X(r; p) = D \
S
(r;p)2RRI X(r; p). Note that a state in X(z; r; p) can
be dominated only by some state in X(z; r; p) [ S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p). No state in
D\S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p) can dominate another state inX(z; r; p) because a state (w0; p0)
that results from player z with wz = 12 and pz 6= r pillaging other players at region
r at (w; p) in X(z; r; p) has 1 > w0z >
1
2
, and thus (w0; p0) =2 D \ X. Therefore,
S \X(z; r; p) must dominate every state in X(z; r; p) n S because S dominates every
state in X(z; r; p) n S. Since S \X(z; r; p) is internally stable, S \X(z; r; p) satises
both internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p). Thus we have
that S \ X(z; r; p) = D \ X(z; r; p) because D \ X(z; r; p) is the unique set that
satises both internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p). Since
r, p, and z with _pz =2 _pr are arbitrary, we have that S\
S
(r;p)2RRI (
S
z =2pr X(z; r; p)) =
D \S(r;p)2RRI (Sz =2pr X(z; r; p)). Since S(r;p)2RRI (X(r; p) [Sz =2pr X(z; r; p)) = X
and S;D \ X  X, we have that S = D \ X.
Finally, we complete the proof that D \ X is the unique set that satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X. We have proven that if a
set satises both internal stability and external stability with respect to X, then it
must beD\ X. Therefore, we need to show thatD\ X satises both internal stability
and external stability with respect to X. Because for any states (w; p); (w0; p0) 2 D,
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we have that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz 
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz or
P
z2fi:wi>w0igw
0
z 
P
z2fi:wi<w0igw
0
z,
the set D is internally stable. Note that for each r, p, and z with pz =2 pr, D\X(r; p)
and D \ X(z; r; p) satisfy external stability with respect to X(r; p) and X(z; r; p),
respectively. Therefore, D \ X is externally stable with respect to X. Consequently,
D \ X satises both internal stability and external stability with respect to X.
In addition, It is easily seen that a stable set S includes D\ X. Note that a state
in X can be dominated only by another state in X. Every state (w0; p0) that results
from player z with wz = 12 being involved in pillaging other players at (w; p) in
X
satises that
P
i2p0r w
0
i = 1 for some r 2 R and thus that (w0; p0) 2 X. Every state
(w00; p00) that results from players in some region r pillaging other players in the same
region r at (w; p) in X satises that for each r 2 R, Pi2p00r w00i = 0; 12 ; or 1 and that
if
P
i2p00r w
00
i =
1
2
for some region r 2 R, then w00z = 12 for some player z. Thus we
have that (w00; p00) 2 X. Since a stable set S dominates every state in X n S, S \ X
dominates every state in X nS. Since S \ X is internally stable, S \ X satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X. Therefore, we have that
S \ X = D\ X and thus that D\ X  S. Since S is an arbitrary stable set, a stable
set includes D \ X.
Proposition 1 completely characterizes stable sets in the three-player and two-
region model.
Proposition 1 In the three-player and two-region model, a set S is a stable set if
and only if S = B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [ (D \ X) for some basic functions 12;3,
23;1, and 
3
1;2 where X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R,
P
i2pr wi = 0;
1
2
; or 1
and if for some region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some player z, wz = 12g.
Proof. We prove the necessary condition rst. Suppose that S is a stable set. By
Lemma 5, there exist basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 such that B(
1
2;3)[B(23;1)[
B(31;2)  S. By Lemma 6, we have that D \ X  S. Therefore, we must have
that B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ (D \ X)  S. To show that B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [
B(31;2)[ (D \ X)  S, it su¢ ces to show that B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[ (D \ X)
is externally stable.
Let _S = B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [ (D \ X). If (w; p) 2 X n _S with wz < 12 for
each z 2 I, then (w; p) is dominated by some state in D \ X such that two players
have halves. Let X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1
and if for some region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some player z, wz = 12g. If
(w; p) 2 X n _S and (w; p) 2 X, then by Lemma 6, (w; p) is dominated by some state
in D\ X such that either two players have halves, or one player has all of the wealth.
If (w; p) 2 X n _S with wi > 12 and pj = pk, then (w; p) is dominated by some state in
D \ X such that player i has all of the wealth.
Let (w; p) 2 X n _S satisfy that p 2 B(i; j; k) and (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Without loss
of generality, we assume that pi = pj. Since 1 > wi  12 and a basic function ij;k(; p) :
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[0; 1
2
] ! [0; 1
2
] is uniformly continuous on [0; 1
2
), lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p) is well dened.
If wi > 12 and wj > 
i
j;k(1   wi; p) or wi = 12 and wj > lim !1 wi ij;k(; p), both of
which mean that wj > lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p), then wk < 1  wi  lim !1 wi ij;k(; p).
Thus there exists a state (w; p) 2 B(ij;k) with wi > wi and wk = wk. In this
case, (w; p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player j. If wi > 12 and wj <
ij;k(1 wi; p) or wi = 12 and wj < lim !1 wi ij;k(; p), both of which mean that wj <
lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p), then (w
0; _p) 2 B(ij;k) such that w0j = lim !1 wi ij;k(; p),
_pz = pz for all z 6= i, and _pi 6= pi dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player k. If
wi =
1
2
and wj = lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p) 6= 14 , then some state in the core such that
two players have halves dominates (w; p). Therefore, _S is externally stable, and thus
_S = S.
Next, we prove the su¢ cient condition, that is, if functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 are
basic functions, then the set B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ (D \ X) is a stable set.
Suppose that S 0 = B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ (D \ X) for some basic functions
12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2. Then S
0 is externally stable as shown above. Now, we need to
show that S 0 is internally stable.
Notice that each B(i; j; k) has four elements and each element p in B(i; j; k) has
its counterpart distribution _p such that _p 2 B(i; j; k), pi 6= _pi, _pj = pj, and _pk = pk.
For example, B(1; 2; 3) = f(1; 1; 2); (1; 2; 1); (2; 1; 2); (2; 2; 1)g and (1; 1; 2) and (1; 2; 1)
are counterpart distributions to (2; 1; 2) and (2; 2; 1), respectively. Therefore, by the
second condition of a basic function, if (w; p); (w0; p) 2 B(ij;k) with wi > w0i > 12 and
pi = pj, then (w; _p); (w0; _p) 2 B(ij;k) with _pi = _pk, and vice versa. Then we have
that wj  w0j and wk < w0k by the rst condition of a basic function since pi = pj and
_pi = _pk. Similarly, we have that wj < w0j and wk  w0k. Consequently, we have that
wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k.
First, we prove that each B(12;3), B(
2
3;1), and B(
3
1;2) is internally stable. Let
(w; p); (w0; p0) 2 B(ij;k) such that (w; p) 6= (w0; p0) and (w; p) =2 C, which is the core.
Since fpj; pkg = fp0j; p0kg = R, i.e. players j and k are distributed all over regions at
p and p0, we have that either p0j 6= pj and p0k 6= pk, or p0j = pj and p0k = pk. Thus if
p0j 6= pj, then fz : pz 6= p0zg * pr for each r 2 R, and so (w0; p0) does not dominate
(w; p).
Suppose that p and p0 satises that p0j = pj and p
0
k = pk. If wi; w
0
i >
1
2
, then
i) wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k; ii) wj > w
0
j and wk > w
0
k; or iii) w = w
0. If either i)
wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k, or ii) wj > w
0
j and wk > w
0
k, then fz : w0z 6= wzg * pr for
each r 2 R. If w = w0 then Pz2fi:w0i>wigwz = Pz2fi:w0i<wigwz = 0. If wi > 12 and
w0i =
1
2
, then
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz 
1
2
<
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz. If wi =
1
2
, wj = 14 , and w
0
i >
1
2
,
then since lim ! 1
2
ij;k() =
1
4
, wj = 14 > w
0
j and wk =
1
4
> w0k. Thus we have that
fi : w0i 6= wig * pr for each r 2 R. If wi = 12 , wj = 14 , and w0i = 12 , then since
w0j =
1
4
or 1
2
, we have that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz =
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz = 0 or
1
4
. Therefore,
in these cases, (w0; p0) does not dominate (w; p). Since (w; p); (w0; p0) 2 B(ij;k) with
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(w; p) 6= (w0; p0) and (w; p) =2 C are arbitrary, each set B(12;3), B(23;1), and B(31;2)
is internally stable.
Second, we check internal stability of the set B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2). Let
(w; p) 2 B(ij;k) and (w00; p00) 2 B(jk;i). Then wi  12 and w00j  12 , and thus wj  12
and w00i  12 . If wi > w00i then
P
z2fy:w00y>wygwz  12  wi 
P
z2fy:w00y<wygwz. If
wi = w
00
i then wi = w
00
i =
1
2
. Since wj 2 f14 ; 12g by the third condition of a basic
function,
P
z2fi:w00i >wigwz =
P
z2fi:w00i <wigwz = 0 or
1
4
. Therefore, (w; p) does not
dominate (w00; p00). Similarly, we can prove that (w00; p00) does not dominate (w; p).
Consequently, B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) is internally stable.
Finally, we examine internal stability of S 0 = B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[(D\ X).
Note that (B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2))\ X  C and that C  D \ X. Since a state
in D\ X can be dominated only by another state in X and D\ X is internally stable,
any state in D \ X is not dominated by another state in B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2).
Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that any state in B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) is not
dominated by another state in D \ X. Let (w; p) 2 B(ij;k). Then we have that
wi  12 . If wi = 1 or wi = 12 and wj = 12 , then (w; p) 2 C, and thus (w; p) is
not dominated by any state in D \ X. If 1 > wi > 12 , then by the basic condition
of B(ij;k), we have that wj > 0 and wk > 0. Also, if wi =
1
2
and wj = 14 , then
wk =
1
4
. In these cases, player i cannot pillage both players j and k simultaneously
since pj 6= pk and cannot be pillaged by another player since wi > 12 > maxfwj; wkg.
Thus if a state (w000; p000) dominates (w; p), then (w000; p000) satises that for some player
z, wz =2 f0; 14 ; 12 ; 1g, that is, (w000; p000) =2 D \ X. Since (w; p) is arbitrary, any state in
B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) is not dominated by another state in D \ X.
Therefore, S 0 is a stable set. Since functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 are arbitrary basic
functions, B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[ (D\ X) for any basic functions 12;3, 23;1, and
31;2 is a stable set.
Proposition 1 shows that a stable set in the three-player two-region model di¤ers
from the stable set D in a one-region model. In this model, a stable set is greater
than the stable set in a one-region model, but it is possible that a stable set does not
include D. Figures 3 and 4 show one possible stable set S on the hyperplanes. Dots
and bold curves in the gures denote states in S at each distribution. In these gures,
the stable set does not contain the states ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 2; 1)) and ((1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2
); (2; 1; 2)),
which are in D. Just like in the case of the core, this change of the stable set results
from the limited feasibility of the dominance relation under the spatial restriction.
Theorem 3 generalizes Proposition 1 to the three-player N region models where
N  2.
Theorem 3 In a three-player N region model where N  2, a set S is a stable set if
and only if S = B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2) [(D\ X) [U(B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[C)
for some basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 where X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region
r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1 and if for some region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for
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Figure 3: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states with p1 = 1
Figure 4: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states with p1 = 2
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some player z, wz = 12g and the set U(B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ C) is the set of
states that are not dominated by any state in B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [ C.
Proof. For any two distinct regions q; r 2 R, dene the set Xq;r of states by Xq;r =
f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, pi = q or rg. Then, it is easily seen that a state in
Xr;q can be dominated only by some state in Xr;q because the act of the pillage
does not disperse players. If there are more than two regions, then dene the set
X indiv: of states by X indiv: = f(w; p) 2 X : for any three distinct regions o; q; and
r, fp1; p2; p3g = fo; q; rgg. That is, X indiv: is the set of states at which each player
occupies its own region alone, i.e. individual region distribution. Note that any state
in X indiv: does not dominate any other state in X, however, it can be dominated by
some state at which only one region contains two players, whose distribution results
from one player pillaging another player. Therefore, a set S is a stable set if and
only if i) for any two distinct regions q and r, S \Xr;q is both internally stable and
externally stable with respect to Xr;q; and ii) S dominates all states in X indiv: except
itself X indiv: \ S.
In the three-player and two-region model, by Proposition 1, a set S is a stable set
if and only if S = B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[ (D\ X) for some basic functions 12;3,
23;1, and 
3
1;2. Without loss of generality, given any two distinct regions q and r, we
can regard a state (w; p) in Xr;q as the state (w; p) in the two-region model and vice
versa. Then, it is easily seen that (w0; p0) 2 Xr;q dominates (w; p) 2 Xr;q if and only
if (w0; p0) dominates (w; p) in the two-region model. Therefore, for any two distinct
regions q and r, S \Xr;q is both internally stable and externally stable with respect
to Xr;q if and only if S \Xr;q = fB(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ (D \ X)g \Xr;q for
some basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2. The observation that for any basic functions
12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2, the set B(
1
2;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ C dominates all states in
X indiv: except U(B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [ C) completes the proof.
Figures 5 and 6 show one possible stable set S on the hyperplanes. Figure 5 covers
distributions where at least two players are in a common region and Figure 6 covers
the other distributions, where each player occupies its own region alone. In these
gures, dots, bold lines, and the gray area denote states in the stable set S. Note
that except for the three corner points and three middle points, the gray area does
not contain boundary lines.
2.2 Stable set in I player and N region models where I = 4
and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3
A stable set does not exist in an I player and N region model where I = 4 and
N = 2, or I  4 and N  3. First, we prove that in the four-player and two-region
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Figure 5: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states such that pj = pk for two distinct
players j and k.
Figure 6: Stable set in the hyperplane of states such that p1 6= p2 6= p3 6= p1
22
model, a stable set must contain a group of states out of basic sets. Second, we
discover some properties of a group of states that are not in basic sets, but are in
a stable set. Next, we show that in the four-player and two-region model, if there
exists a stable set S, then we can nd a state (w; p) such that (w; p) cannot be
in S and S cannot dominate (w; p). It is because S contains four states and the
properties of these states assure that S dominates every state that dominates (w; p).
Finally, we generalize the result in the four-player and two-region model and verify
the nonexistence of a stable set in an I player and N region model where I  4
and N  3.
Lemma 7 shows another property of a stable set. To satisfy both internal and
external stabilities, a stable set must contain some states outside the basic sets as
well as some basic states. Lemma 7 reveals relation among states that are outside
the basic states and belong to some stable set.
Lemma 7 In the four-player and two-region model, for some player j, let a distribu-
tion p satisfy p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Then given a stable set S, there exists a positive
real number ap such that [0; ap]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. In particular, if
(w0; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p), then [0; w0j]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Proof. Let a distribution _p 2 B(i; j; k) with _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Note that
B(i; j; k) is the set of distributions at which player i is together with only either player
j or player k; that is, at the distribution _p, there exists a region r 2 R such that
_pr = fi; jg or fi; kg. At the distribution p, player j is alone in a region and player k is
together with the other players including player i. Therefore, we must have that _pi =
_pj so that player i is together with only one player in a common region. By Lemma
5, there exists a basic function ij;k with (B(
i
j;k) [ C) \ Bij;k(12 ; _p) = S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p).
By the rst condition of a basic function, there exists _ 2 (0; 1
2
) with ij;k( _; _p) > 0.
According to Corollary 1, ij;k(; _p) is uniformly continuous on [0; 12). Since ij;k(0; _p) =
0, the intermediate value theorem implies that [0; ij;k( _; _p)]  ij;k([0; _]; _p).
To prove the rst assertion, it su¢ ces to show that [0; ij;k( _; _p)]  fwj : (w; p) 2
S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. For any  2 [0; ij;k( _; _p)], let  = minf 2 [0; _] : ij;k(; _p) = g,
which is well dened by the uniform continuity of ij;k on [0; _] because if a function
is continuous, then the inverse image of a closed set under the function is a closed set.
Given any  2 [0; _], let the allocation w satisfy that wi = 1  , wj = ij;k(; _p),
and wk =    ij;k(; _p). Then we have that (w; _p) 2 B(ij;k) \ Bij;k(12 ; _p) and thus
that (w; _p) 2 S. Suppose by way of contradiction that (w; p) =2 S. Every state
that results from player i pillaging either player j or player k at (w; p) dominates
(w; _p) 2 S as well as (w; p). Every state that results from either player j or player
k engaging in pillage at (w; p), regardless of player i0s participation, is dominated by
some state in the core such that player i has the total wealth because players j and
k get together in a common region and player i has greater than a half. Therefore,
S cannot dominate (w; p), and thus S lacks external stability. This contradiction
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guarantees that (w; p) 2 S and thus that  = wj 2 fwj : (w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p)g since
(w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Since  2 [0; ij;k( _; _p)] is arbitrary, we have that [0; ij;k( _; _p)] 
fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
In particular, if (w0; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p), then by Lemma 2, (w0; _p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; _p).
By the same way as shown above, we can show that for any  2 [0; w0j],  2 fwj :
(w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g and thus that [0; w0j]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Lemmas 8, 9, and 10 strengthen Lemma 7 by revealing relations between states
that are outside the basic states and belong to some stable set.
Lemma 8 In the four-player and two-region model, for some player j, let a distri-
bution p satisfy either p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Then given a stable set S, for any
a 2 (0; 1
2
), there exists a state (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) such that a > wj +wk > wj > 0
and [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. In addition, if (w0; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)
with wj > w0j > 0, then we have that wk  w0k > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 5, there exists a basic function ij;k with B(
i
j;k)  S. Let
the distribution _p 2 B(i; j; k) satisfy _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Then since ij;k(; _p) is
dened on [0; 1
2
], for any a 2 (0; 1
2
), we can nd the allocation wa with waj = 
i
j;k(a; _p),
wak = a ij;k(a; _p), and wai = 1 a. Then we have that (wa; _p) 2 B(ij;k). By Lemma
7, there exists a state ( _w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) with _wj > 0 and [0; _wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g. Let a state (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) satisfy that 0 < wj < minf _wj; waj g.
We will show that (w; p) satises all required conditions, that is, a > wj+wk > wj > 0
and [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Since (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p), by Lemma 2, we have that (w; _p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p).
Since waj > wj > 0 and w
a
i >
1
2
, the basic condition means that wi > wai and wk > 0,
and thus we have that a > 1  wi = wj + wk > wj > 0. Since (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p),
Lemma 7 assures the second condition, [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
In addition, let (w0; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) with w0j 2 (0; wj). Then by Lemma 2, we
have that (w0; _p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p). Since wj > w0j > 0 and wi > 1   a > 12 , the basic
condition of S implies that wi < w0i < 1 and thus that wk  w0k > 0.
Lemma 9 In the four-player and two-region model, for the distinct four players i,
j, k, and y, let distributions p and p0 satisfy either p1 = fjg and p01 = fi; j; yg, or
p2 = fjg and p02 = fi; j; yg. Given a stable set S, suppose that (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)
and (w0; p0) 2 S \Bik;y(12 ; p0). If wi; w0i > 12 and wj = w0k, then wk  wj or w0y  w0k.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that wi; w0i >
1
2
, wj = w0k, wj > wk, and
w0k > w
0
y. Lemma 7 implies that [0; w
0
k]  fwk : (w; p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0)g. Since
w0k = wj > wk, there exists a state ( _w
0; p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0) with _w0k = wk. Let
_p0 2 B(i; k; y) satisfy _p0i 6= p0i and _p0z = p0z for each z 6= i. Since (w0; p0); ( _w0; p0) 2
S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0), we have that (w0; _p0); ( _w0; _p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; _p0) by Lemma 2. Since
wi; w
0
i >
1
2
and w0k > wk = _w
0
k, the basic condition of S means that w
0
i < _w
0
i and
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thus that w0y  _w0y. Since w0k > w0y, we have that wj = w0k > w0y  _w0y and thus that
_w0i = 1  _w0k  _w0y > 1  _w0k wj = 1 wk wj = wi. Since wi+wj +wk = 1, we have
that wy = 0. Therefore, we have that _w0i > wi >
1
2
, _w0k = wk, and _w
0
y > wy = 0. Note
that the distribution p0 results from players i and y moving to the region of player j
at the distribution p. Therefore, ( _w0; p0) 2 S dominates (w; p) 2 S by players i and
y pillaging player j at (w; p). This contradiction guarantees that if wi; w0i >
1
2
and
wj = w
0
k, then wk  wj or w0y  w0k.
Lemma 10 In the four-player and two-region model, for any player j, let a dis-
tribution p satisfy either p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Given a stable set S, if (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(12 ; p) and (w0; p) 2 S \Bij;y(12 ; p) with wj = w0j > 0, then wi = w0i.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p), (w0; p) 2 S \
Bij;y(
1
2
; p), wj = w0j > 0 and wi 6= w0i. Since (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p) and (w0; p) 2 Bij;y(12 ; p),
we have that wi  12  wj+wk and w0i  12  w0j+w0y. Since wj; w0j > 0, we have that
wi > wk and w0i > w
0
y. Therefore, if wi > w
0
i then (w; p) 2 S dominates (w0; p) 2 S
by either player i or players i and k pillaging player y at (w0; p). Similarly, if wi < w0i
then (w0; p) 2 S dominates (w; p) 2 S. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 11 synthesizes the previous results in this subsection and shows that in
the four-player and two-region model, a stable set S contains four distinct states that
satisfy six conditions introduced in this lemma. We can use these four states to show
the nonexistence of stable set. The six conditions guarantee that there exists a state
(w; p) that S cannot contain or dominate.
Lemma 11 In the four-player and two-region model, a stable set S contains four
states ( _w; p0), ( w; p00), (
...
w; p000), and (w; p000) such that for some four distinct players i,
j, k, and y, i) distributions p0, p00, and p000 satisfy either p01 = fjg, p001 = fi; j; yg, and
p0001 = fkg, or p02 = fjg, p002 = fi; j; yg, and p0002 = fkg; ii) ( _w; p0) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0),
( w; p00) 2 S \Bik;j(12 ; p00), and (
...
w; p000); (w; p000) 2 S \Bik;j(12 ; p000); iii) wk > _wk  _wj >
0; iv) wj;
...
wj <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
wk > _wk + _wj; and vi) wj  wk = _wj.
Proof. Let distributions p, p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4), and p(5) satisfy that either
p1 = fi; j; yg, p(1)1 = fjg, p(2)1 = fi; j; kg, p(3)1 = fkg, p(4)1 = fi; k; yg, and
p(5)1 = fyg; or p2 = fi; j; yg, p(1)2 = fjg, p(2)2 = fi; j; kg, p(3)2 = fkg, p(4)2 =
fi; k; yg, and p(5)2 = fyg. By Lemma 8, there exist states ( w; p) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p),
( w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(1)), (
...
w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)), (
...
w(3); p(3)) 2 S \
Bik;j(
1
2
; p(3)), (
...
w(4); p(4)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(4)), and ( w(5); p(5)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(5))
with 0 < wj; wk; w
(1)
j ; w
(1)
y ;
...
w(2)k ;
...
w(2)y ;
...
w(3)j ;
...
w(3)k ;
...
w(4)j ;
...
w(4)y ; w
(5)
k ; w
(5)
y < 14 . Lemma 8
also implies that there exist states ( _w; p) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p), (w; p) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p),
( _w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p(1)), (w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(1)), ( _w(2); p(2)) 2 S \
Biy;j(
1
2
; p(2)), (w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)), (w(3); p(3)) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p(3)), and
(w(4); p(4)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(4)) such that 0 < _wk + _wy; _w(1)j + _w(1)k ; _w(2)j + _w(2)y <
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minf wk; w(1)j ; w(5)y ;
...
w(2)y ;
...
w(3)k ;
...
w(4)j g and _wk = wk = _w(1)j = w(1)j = _w(2)y = w(2)y =
w
(3)
k = w
(4)
j > 0.
Since _w(1)j = w
(1)
j > 0, Lemma 10 means that _w
(1)
i = w
(1)
i and thus that _w
(1)
k =
w
(1)
y . If w
(1)
y  w(1)j then _w(1)k = w(1)y  w(1)j = _w(1)j . Therefore, if w(1)y  w(1)j
and w(3)j  w(3)k , then the states ( _w(1); p(1)), ( w; p), (
...
w(3); p(3)), and (w(3); p(3))
satisfy all required conditions; that is, for some four distinct players i, j, k, and
y, i) distributions p(1), p, and p(3) satisfy either p(1)1 = fjg, p1 = fi; j; yg, and
p(3)1 = fkg, or p(1)2 = fjg, p2 = fi; j; yg, and p(3)2 = fkg; ii) ( _w(1); p(1)) 2
S\Bij;k(12 ; p(1)), ( w; p) 2 S\Bik;j(12 ; p), and (
...
w(3); p(3)); (w(3); p(3)) 2 S\Bik;j(12 ; p(3));
iii) wk > _w
(1)
k  _w(1)j > 0; iv) wj;
...
w(3)j <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
w(3)k > _w
(1)
j + _w
(1)
k ; and vi)
w
(3)
j  w(3)k = _w(1)j .
Note that if wi = 12 , then since wj + wk =
1
2
and wk < 14 , we have that wj >
1
4
> wk, and thus some state in the core such that players i and j have halves
dominates (w; p) 2 S. This contradiction shows that we must have that wi > 12 .
Similarly, we can show that we have that w(1)i , w
(2)
i , w
(3)
i , and w
(4)
i >
1
2
. Therefore,
if w(1)y < w
(1)
j , then since wi, w
(1)
i , and w
(2)
i >
1
2
, Lemma 9 implies that wj  wk
and w(2)k  w(2)y . Since _wk = wk, by Lemma 10, we have that _wi = wi and thus
that _wy = wj  wk = _wk. In this case, the states ( _w; p), ( w(5); p(5)), (...w(2); p(2)),
and (w(2); p(2)) satisfy all six conditions; that is, for some four distinct players i, k,
y, and j, i) distributions p, p(5), and p(2) satisfy p1 = fkg, p(5)1 = fi; j; kg, and
p(2)1 = fyg, or p2 = fkg, p(5)2 = fi; j; kg, and p(2)2 = fyg; ii) ( _w; p) 2 S\Bik;y(12 ; p),
( w(5); p(5)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(5)), and (
...
w(2); p(2)), (w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)); iii)
w
(5)
y > _wy  _wk > 0, iv) w(5)k ;
...
w(2)k <
1
4
, v) 1
4
>
...
w(2)y > _wk + _wy, and vi) w
(2)
k 
w
(2)
y = _wk. Similarly, if w
(3)
j < w
(3)
k , then ( _w
(2); p(2)), ( w(1); p(1)), (
...
w(4); p(4)), and
(w(4); p(4)) satisfy all six conditions.
Proposition 2 proves the nonexistence of stable set in the four-player and two-
region model.
Proposition 2 No stable set exists in the four-player and two-region model.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S in the
four-player and two-region model. Then by Lemma 11, there exist four states ( _w; p0),
( w; p00), (
...
w; p000), and (w; p000) such that for some four distinct players i, j, k, and y,
i) distributions p0, p00, and p000 satisfy either p01 = fjg, p001 = fi; j; yg, and p0001 = fkg,
or p02 = fjg, p002 = fi; j; yg, and p0002 = fkg; ii) ( _w; p0) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0), ( w; p00) 2
S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00), and (
...
w; p000), (w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000); iii) wk > _wk  _wj > 0; iv)
wj;
...
wj <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
wk > _wk + _wj; and vi) wj  wk = _wj.
Dene the set of states T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) = f(w; p) : wi = 1  _wj2 , wj = _wj,minf wk;
...
wk 
_wjg  wk > _wk, and p = p0g. Then, we can show that T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) has uncount-
ably many elements. Note that by conditions iii) and v), minf wk; ...wk   _wjg > _wk.
26
Let a 2 R4 satisfy that ai = 1  _wj2 , aj = _wj, minf wk;
...
wk   _wjg  ak > _wk, and
ay = 1  ai   aj   ak. Since 1 > _wj > 0 and _wk > 0, we have that ai; aj; ak 2 (0; 1).
Note that ay = 1   1  _wj2   _wj   ak > 12   _wj2   _wk > 14 , that is, ay 2 (14 ; 1). Since
ai+aj+ak+ay = 1, a is an allocation in the four-player model. Since a satises all re-
quirements to be an allocation in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0), we have that (a; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0).
It is easily seen that for any " 2 (0; ak  _wk), ((ai; aj; ak "; ay+"); p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0).
We will prove that T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) contains some state that S cannot contain or
dominate. First, we show that there exists a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) that S cannot
contain. Note that for any distinct states (w; p0), (w0; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), we have
that wi = w0i, wj = w
0
j, and either w
0
y > wy > wk > w
0
k or wy > w
0
y > w
0
k > wk. If
w0y > wy > wk > w
0
k, then (w
0; p0) dominates (w0; p0) by player y pillaging player k.
Similarly, if wy > w0y > w
0
k > wk, then (w; p
0) dominates (w0; p0). Therefore, internal
stability of S means that T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S has at most one element. In addition,
for any (w; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), there exists a state (w00; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) such that
w00i = wi, w
00
j = wj, and w
00
y > wy > wk > w
00
k ; that is, every state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) is
dominated by another state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0). Therefore, there exists a state (wT ; p0) 2
T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) such that (wT ; p0) dominates a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S, which can
be empty. Then we have that (wT ; p0) =2 S. Next, we show that S cannot dominate
(wT ; p0).
Let the set of states T1(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player j at (wT ; p0)g. Note that wTk + wTy = 1  wTi   wTj = 1  1  _wj2   _wj = 1  _wj2 =
wTi . Let (w
T1 ; p) 2 T1(wT ; p0). Since wTi = wTk + wTy , wTj = _wj, and wTk > _wk,
we have that wT1i > w
T1
k + w
T1
y , w
T1
j < w
T
j = _wj, and w
T1
k = w
T
k > _wk. Since
( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0), Lemma 7 implies that [0; _wj]  fwj : (w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0)g.
Therefore, S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) contains ( _wT1 ; p0) with _wT1j = wT1j . Since _wj > _wT1j , by
Lemma 8, we have that _wk  _wT1k and thus that wT1k > _wT1k . Therefore, (wT1 ; p) in
T1(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _wT1 ; p0) in S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) by player i pillaging players k
and y. Since (wT1 ; p) 2 T1(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, every state in T1(wT ; p0) is dominated
by some state in S \Bij;k(12 ; p0) through player i pillaging players k and y. Therefore,
we must have that T1(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T2(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player k at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT2 ; p0) 2 T2(wT ; p0), we have that wT2i >
wT2k + w
T2
y , w
T2
j = _wj, and w
T2
y = w
T
y > w
T
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y , w
T
j = _wj,
and wTy >
1
4
> wTk . Therefore, every state in T2(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2
S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) through players i and k pillaging player y when _wk > wT2k , through
player i pillaging player y when _wk = w
T2
k , or through player i pillaging players k and
y when _wk < w
T2
k . Therefore, we have that T2(w
T ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T3(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player y at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT3 ; p0) 2 T3(wT ; p0), we have that wT3i >
wT3k + w
T3
y , w
T3
j = _wj, and w
T3
k = w
T
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y , w
T
j = _wj, and
wTk > _wk. Therefore, every state in T3(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0)
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through player i either pillaging players k and y when wT3y > 0, or pillaging player k
when wT3y = 0. Therefore, we have that T3(w
T ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T4(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player y pillaging
player k at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT4 ; p0) 2 T4(wT ; p0). Since wTi = wTk + wTy and wTy >
1
4
> _wk, we have that w
T4
i  wT4y > _wk and wT4j = _wj. Note that dominance relation
in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) is transitive; that is, if (w; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) is dominated by
(w0; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) and (w0; p0) is dominated by (w00; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), then
because wi = w0i = w
00
i , wj = w
0
j = w
00
j , and w
00
y > w
0
y > wy > wk > w
0
k > w
00
k , (w; p
0)
is dominated by (w00; p0) through player y pillaging player k at (w; p0). Therefore, if
wT4k > _wk, then (w
T4 ; p) is still in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) and thus since (wT ; p0) dominates
a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S, which can be empty, (wT4 ; p0) dominates a state in
T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S. This means that (wT4 ; p0) =2 S. If _wk  wT4k > 0, then (wT4 ; p0) is
dominated by ( _w; p0) in S \Bij;k(12 ; p0) either through player i pillaging player y when
_wk = w
T4
k , or through players i and k pillaging player y when _wk > w
T4
k . If w
T4
k = 0,
then wT4i = w
T4
y > w
T4
j , and thus (w
T4 ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such
that players i and y have halves. Since (wT4 ; p0) 2 T4(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we have
that T4(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T5(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player y pillaging
player j at (wT ; p1)g. Then for each (wT5 ; p) 2 T5(wT ; p0), we have that wT5i + wT5k >
wT5j +w
T5
y and
1
2
> wT5i > w
T5
k since w
T
i > w
T
y , w
T
k > w
T
j and
1
2
> wTi > w
T
k . Therefore,
every state in T5(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such that players i
and k have halves. Therefore, we have that T5(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T6(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player k pillaging
player j at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT6 ; p) 2 T6(wT ; p0), we have that wT6i + wT6y >
wT6j +w
T6
k and
1
2
> wT6i > w
T6
y since
1
2
> wTi > w
T
y > w
T
k > w
T
j . Therefore, every state
in T6(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such that players i and y have
halves. Therefore, we have that T6(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T7(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and y
pillaging player k at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT7 ; p) 2 T7(wT ; p0), we have that
wT7i > w
T7
k + w
T7
y , w
T
j = _wj, and w
T7
y > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y and w
T
y > _wk.
Therefore, every state in T7(wT ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0). Therefore,
we have that T7(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T8(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and y
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT8 ; p00) 2 T8(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTj + wTy ,
wk  wTk , and wTy > 14 > wj, we have that wT8i > wT8j + wT8y , wk  wTk = wT8k , and
wT8y > w
T
y > wj. When w
T8
k = wk, (w
T8 ; p00) is dominated by ( w; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
through player i pillaging players j and y when wj < w
T8
j , through player i pillaging
player y when wj = w
T8
j , or through players i and j pillaging player y when wj > w
T8
j .
Now, we check the case that wk > w
T8
k . Since ( w; p
00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00), Lemma 7
implies that [0; wk]  fwk : (w; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)g. Therefore, S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
contains the state ( wT8 ; p00) such that wT8k = w
T8
k . Since wk > w
T8
k , Lemma 8 implies
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that wj  wT8j and thus that wT8y > wTy > 14 > wj  wT8j . Therefore, (wT8 ; p00) 2
T8(w
T ; p0) is dominated by the state ( wT8 ; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00) through player i
pillaging players j and y when wT8j < w
T8
j , through player i pillaging player y when
wT8j = w
T8
j , or through players i and j pillaging player y when w
T8
j > w
T8
j . Since
(wT8 ; p00) 2 T8(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we have that T8(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T9(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and k
pillaging player y at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT9 ; p0) 2 T9(wT ; p0), we have that
wT9i > w
T9
k + w
T9
y , w
T9
j = _wj, and w
T9
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y and w
T
k > _wk.
Therefore, every state in T9(wT ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0). Therefore,
we have that T9(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T10(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and k
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT10 ; p) 2 T10(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTy > 14 ,
wj  wk = _wj = wTj , and
...
wk   _wj  wTk > _wj, we have that wT10i > wT10y > 14 ,
wj  wTj > wT10j , and
...
wk > w
T10
k > wk. Since (
...
w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000), Lemma 7
implies that [0;
...
wk]  fwk : (w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000)g. Therefore, S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
contains the state (
...
wT10 ; p000) with
...
wT10k = w
T10
k . Since
...
wk > w
T10
k > wk, Lemma 8
means that
...
wj  ...wT10j  wj. Since wT10y > 14 >
...
wj  ...wT10j > wT10j , (
...
wT10 ; p000) 2
S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00) dominates the state (wT10 ; p) by players i and j pillaging player y.
Since (wT10 ; p) 2 T10(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, every state in T10(wT ; p0) is dominated by
some state in S \Bik;j(12 ; p000). Therefore, we have that T10(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T11(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players k and y
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT11 ; p) 2 T11(wT ; p0), we have that
wT11i < w
T11
j +w
T11
k +w
T11
y ,
1
2
> wT11y , and
1
4
> wT11k > w
T11
j since w
T
i < w
T
j +w
T
k +w
T
y ,
1
2
> wTy + w
T
j , and
1
4
>
...
wk  wTk + wTj . Note that by Lemma 6, D \ X  S where
X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1 and if for some
region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some player z, wz = 12g. Therefore, every
state in T11(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state (w; p) in D \ X such that wy = 12 ,
wj = wk =
1
4
, and pp
0
i = I through players j, k, and y pillaging player i. Therefore,
we have that T11(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Finally, let the set of states T12(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i, k,
and y pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT12 ; p) 2 T12(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTy +wTj
and wTi > w
T
y >
1
4
> wTk + w
T
j , we have that w
T12
i > w
T12
y >
1
4
> wT12j + w
T12
k . If
wT12i >
1
2
, then (wT12 ; p) is dominated by some state in the core such that player i has
the total wealth. If wT12i  12 , then (wT12 ; p) is dominated by some state in the core
at which players i and j have halves. Since (wT12 ; p0) 2 T12(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we
have that T12(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Therefore, (wT ; p) =2 S cannot be dominated by any state in S. This contradiction
shows that there is no stable set in the four-player and two-region model.
Theorem 4 generalizes Proposition 2 to an I player and N region model where
I = 4 and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3.
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Theorem 4 No stable set exists in an I player and N region model where I = 4
and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a stable set S. For any four
distinct players i, j, k, and y, dene the set F (i; j; k; y) of states by F (i; j; k; y) =
f(w; p) : wi + wj + wk + wy = 1, p1 [ p2 = fi; j; k; yg, and p3 = I n fi; j; k; yg if
N  3g. Then any state in F (i; j; k; y) cannot be dominated by another state in
X nF (i; j; k; y). Thus S \F (i; j; k; y) is externally stable with respect to F (i; j; k; y).
Obviously S \ F (i; j; k; y) is internally stable. Therefore, S \ F (i; j; k; y) is both
internal stable and external stable with respect to F (i; j; k; y). It is easily seen that
S \ F (i; j; k; y) of states can be adapted for a stable set in the four-player and two-
region model. This contradicts Proposition 2, which shows nonexistence of stable set
in the four-player and two-region model. This contradiction completes the proof.
3 Core in expectation
As shown in section 2, the stable set with respect to the dominance relation is not re-
garded as a plausible solution to the spatial pillage game. In I player and N region
models where I = 4 and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3, no stable set exists. In three-
player models, there exist stable sets. However, they contain implausible states, such
as some states in the set of states X#I = f(w; p) : for some player i, 1 > wi > 12g.
According to the interpretation about a stable set in Harsanyi (1974), no state in X#I
can be a plausible outcome because one of the players has enough power to pillage
the others, so eventually the player will pillage the rest of the wealth. That is, any
state in X#I is directly or indirectly dominated by the core and thus cannot be a
stable state.
These problems with the stable set with respect to the dominance relation are
caused by the limited feasibility of dominance relation under the spatial restriction.
This limited feasibility of dominance relation, in turn, makes the conditions of the
stable set, both internal stability and external stability, improper to be requirements
for a solution to the spatial pillage game. The external stability requires that any
state outside a stable set be directly dominated by some state in the stable set. With
respect to this limited dominance relation, some states in X#I are directly dominated
only by other states in X#I , thus a stable set must contain some states in X#I to
satisfy external stability. Also, with respect to this limited dominance relation, the
core cannot directly dominate every state in X#I , and thus an internally stable set
can include both the core and some states in X#I . This explains why stable sets in
three-player models contain some states in X#I .
In I player and N region models where I = 4 and N = 2, or I  4 and
N  3, if an internally stable set S 0 includes a set, of states, that dominates every
state in X#I n S 0, then due to the limited feasibility of the dominance relation, S 0
contains improperly many states so that there exists some state (w; p) =2 S 0 such
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that S 0 inevitably dominates every state that dominates (w; p). Thus, by the internal
stability of S 0, S 0 cannot dominate (w; p), which is not in S 0. That is, there is no
set of states that satises both internal stability and external stability. This explains
why no stable set exists in these models.
Jordan (2006) introduced a new solution concept, farsighted core. This far-
sighted core is dened based on an advanced concept of dominance relation, Dom-
inance in Expectation. In this dominance in expectation, players make an ex-
pectation about how each state proceeds, and they pillage or defend according to
their expectation. Naturally, this advanced concept of dominance relation allows
broader feasibility of dominance relation while satisfying the spatial restriction. As a
result, this solution concept based on the dominance in expectation solves the prob-
lems with the stable set based on the previous dominance relation and provides the
unique solution which represents an endogenous balance of power,as Jordan (2006)
mentioned.
Formal denitions of this solution concept are as follows. An expectation is a
belief that all players have in common and indicates how each state proceeds.
Denition 11 An expectation is a function f : X  ! X satisfying, for some
integer k  2, fk = fk 1 where fk = f  fk 1. Let fw(w; p) and fp(w; p) denote the
allocation and the distribution at f(w; p), respectively.
Jordan (2006) considered only one step expectation where every state reaches its
stationary state within one step, i.e. f = f 2. Here, the expectation is extended as
a nite step expectation where some states take nite steps, possibly more than one
step, to reach their stationary states. Based on this extended expectation, this study
shows the same result, Corollary 2, as the result in Jordan (2006).
Dominance in Expectation between states indicates the possible states that the
present state can change to provided that players follow the expectation after the
changes. Just like in the previous dominance relation, both physical and spatial con-
ditions should be satised in order for a winning coalition in expectation, who end
up being better o¤, to change its present state through defeating a losing coalition in
expectation, who end up being worse o¤. Physical condition is reected on the condi-
tions iii) and iv) in Denition 12 and spatial condition is reected on the conditions
i) and ii).
Denition 12 Let an expectation f satisfy fk = fk+1. Given states ( w; p) and
(w(n); p(n)), for each n 2 N, dene W (n)f = fi : fkw( w; p)i > w(n)ig and L(n)f =
fi : fkw( w; p)i < w(n)ig. Then a state ( w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation if
there exists a sequence of states f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1 that has (w(1); p(1)) = (w; p) and
(w(N); p(N)) = ( w; p) such that for each 1  n  N   1 and for some r 2 R, i)
fi : w(n + 1)i 6= w(n)ig  p(n + 1)r; ii) for all q 6= r, p(n + 1)q = p(n)q n (W (n)f \
p(n+ 1)r); iii)
P
i2W (n)f \p(n+1)r
w(n)i >
P
i2L(n)f \p(n+1)r
w(n)i; and iv)
P
i2W (n)f
w(n)i
>
P
i2L(n)f
w(n)i.
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This dominance relation concept reects playersability to forecast how each state
proceeds. With this forecasting ability, the players try to maximize their allocations
in a nal state. Thus, if some players expect that they belong to a losing coalition
in expectation, L(n)f , who will be pillaged and so will be worse o¤ in a nal state,
then they might have an incentive to get together in a common region and combine
their powers in order to defend themselves against a winning coalition in expectation,
W
(n)
f , who will be better o¤ in the nal state. However, under the condition iv), L
(n)
f
basically has no power to deter W (n)f from pillaging L
(n)
f even when all members of
L
(n)
f get together and combine their powers. This is because in this case, W
(n)
f can
also get together and combine their powers to pillage L(n)f . As a result, under the
condition iv), L(n)f has no incentive to take any defensive action and therefore, this
condition is necessary that W (n)f successfully pillages L
(n)
f when the players have the
forecasting ability.
However, the condition iv) is not su¢ cient that W (n)f practically executes its plan
to pillage L(n)f . This is because W
(n)
f can exert its power only under the spatial
restriction. Together with the condition iv), the conditions i), ii), and iii) represent
su¢ cient conditions that W (n)f executes its plan to pillage L
(n)
f under the spatial
restriction. These conditions are similar to the conditions in Denition 4 except the
condition ii). So, the condition i) means that in each step of the pillaging process,
transfers of wealth happen only in one region r where pillage actually happens. Also,
the condition iii) denotes that members of W (n)f in the region r have enough power
to pillage members of L(n)f in that region r. So, this pillage by the members of W
(n)
f
is feasible. But, the condition ii) di¤ers from the condition ii) in Denition 4 in that
the condition ii) allows more ways of forming a coalition. Under the condition ii),
just like under the condition ii) in Denition 4, only members of W (n)f travel, but
in contrast to the condition ii) in Denition 4 they can come from more than one
regions.
In addition, this denition di¤ers from the denition of dominance in expecta-
tion in Jordan (2006) in that this denition generalizes the number of steps that the
dominance relation can take. Jordan (2006) introduced one step dominance in expec-
tation in which every plan to change a state can be completed within one step, i.e.
(w(1); p(1)) = (w; p) and (w(2); p(2)) = ( w; p). However, in this setting, the players
have a forecasting ability, and thus it is also a natural assumption that the players
can make a nite step plan to change a state such that the plan can take more than
one steps before it ends, i.e. (w(N); p(N)) = ( w; p) for some N  2. So, Denition
12 can be considered as a general version of the denition in Jordan (2006).
An expectation is consistent if it is organized in accord with the relation of dom-
inance in expectation.
Denition 13 An expectation f is consistent if f(w; p) dominates (w; p) in expec-
tation whenever f(w; p) 6= (w; p) and (w; p) is undominated in expectation whenever
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f(w; p) = (w; p).
Jordan (2006) interpreted consistency as a rational expectation property.He
said that an expectation is consistent if only rational acts of pillage are expected,
and an allocation is expected to persist only if no rational pillage is possible.
Farsighted core and farsighted supercore1 are dened as follows.
Denition 14 Given a consistent expectation f , the farsighted core under the
expectation f is the set of states Kf = f(w; p) 2 X : under the expectation f , no
state in X dominates (w; p) in expectationg. The farsighted supercore CS is the
intersection of all farsighted cores.
A farsighted core is a set of stationary states under some consistent expectation.
The farsighted supercore is the set of stationary states for all consistent expectations.
Theorem 5 states that for any consistent expectation, the set of dyadic states D is
the unique farsighted core and therefore is the farsighted supercore.
Theorem 5 A consistent expectation f exists and the farsighted core Kf under f is
the set of dyadic states, D. Therefore, the farsighted supercore CS is also D.
Lemma 12 For any state (w; p), if an allocation w0 satises
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi >
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi
and f(w0; p) = (w0; p) for every distribution p, then there exists a distribution p0
such that (w0; p0) dominates (w; p) in expectation.
Proof. Suppose that a state (w; p) and an allocation w0 satisfy the premise of this
lemma. To prove this, it su¢ ces to construct a sequence of states f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1
that can make (w0; p0) dominate (w; p) in expectation for some p0.
Let W 0f = fi : w0i > wig and L0f = fi : w0i < wig. Select (w(2); p(2)) such that
(w(2); p(2)) results from W 0fs pillaging all members of L
0
f in the region minfpi : i 2
L0fg and also from W 0fs proportioning their wealth to w0. Similarly, select states
(w(n); p(n)) for n 2 N until w(N) = w0 for some N . Then the sequence of the states
f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1 makes (w0; p0) dominate (w; p) in expectation for some p0.
Lemma 13 (Lemma 3.10 in Jordan, 2006) For some positive integer k, let w be
a dyadic allocation such that for each i, if wi > 0 then wi  2 (k+1). If an allocation w0
satises that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz >
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz, then there exists a dyadic allocation
w00 such that
P
z2fi:w00i >w0igw
0
z >
P
z2fi:w00i <w0igw
0
z and for each i, if w
00
i > 0 then w
00
i 
2k.
Proof of Theorem 5. 2First, we are going to construct a consistent expectation
that has a farsighted core D and then will prove the uniqueness of the farsighted core.
1Farsighted supercore is named after Roths (1976) supercore.
2The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in Jordan (2006).
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Construct an expectation f as follows. If (w; p) 2 D, then f(w; p) = (w; p). If
(w; p) =2 D, then select a dyadic allocationw0 such thatPi2fi:w0i>wigwi >Pi2fi:w0i<wigwi.
Theorem 2 assures the existence of w0. Let W 0f = fi : w0i > wig and L0f = fi : w0i <
wig. Construct f(w; p) such that f(w; p) results from W 0fs pillaging all members of
L0f in the region minfpi : i 2 L0fg and also from W 0fs proportioning their wealth to
w0. Similarly, construct fn(w; p) for n 2 N until fNw (w; p) = w0 for some N .
Now, we need to show the expectation f constructed above is consistent. If
(w; p) =2 D, then for each n  N 1, we have thatP
i2W (n)f
fnw(w; p)i >
P
i2L(n)f
fnw(w; p)i
whereW (n)f = fi : w0i > fnw(w; p)ig and L(n)f = fi : w0i < fnw(w; p)ig. That is, the fourth
condition in Denition 12 is satised. Also, it is easily seen that the expectation f is
designed to satisfy the other three conditions in Denition 12. Consequently, for each
n  N , a state fn(w; p) dominates fn 1(w; p) in expectation where f 0(w; p) = (w; p).
In addition, no state (w; p) in D is dominated in expectation by another state (w0; p0)
in D because
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi 
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi by Theorem 2. That is, if (w; p) 2 D
and thus f(w; p) = (w; p), then (w; p) is not dominated in expectation. Therefore,
the expectation f is consistent.
To prove the uniqueness of a farsighted core, let f be a consistent expectation with
the farsighted core Kf . Also, for each non-negative integer n, dene Dn = f(w; p) 2
D : wi = 0 or  (12)ng. Then, we have D0  Kf . Suppose, by way of induction, that
for some n, we have Dn  Kf . Note that if (w; p) 2 Dn, then (w; p0) 2 Dn for any
distribution p0. Thus, by Lemmas 12 and 13, any state (w0; p0) that dominates some
state (w; p) 2 Dn+1 in expectation is dominated in expectation by some state (w00; p00)
in Dn because the allocation w0 satises that
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi >
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi. Since
f is consistent, we have thatDn+1  Kf . By induction, we haveD  Kf . In addition,
D dominated all states outside D by Theorem 2 and Lemma 12. Again, since f is
consistent, if (w; p) =2 D, then (w; p) =2 Kf , that is, Kf  D. Therefore, we have
Kf = D, and since f is an arbitrary consistent expectation, we have CS = D.
This result is similar to the result in Jordan (2006), which stated that D is the
unique farsighted core in one region models, which, in turn, do not have the spa-
tial restriction. Clearly, dominance relation with respect to dominance in expec-
tation changes if we introduce the spatial restriction. For example, lets consider
the dominance relation between the following two states; ( w; p) = ((1; 0); (1; 1)) and
(w; p) = ((3
4
; 1
4
); (2; 2)). Then ( w; p) and (w; p) satisfy the physical condition for the
dominance relation because
P
i2fi: wi>wigwi >
P
i2fi: wi<wigwi. So, if there is no spa-
tial restriction, then ( w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation. But, if we introduce the
spatial restriction, then ( w; p) does not dominate (w; p) in expectation because any
possible pillaging movement from (w; p) will results in the distribution (2; 2). That
is, in this example, dominance relation with respect to dominance in expectation has
changed under the spatial restriction. Nevertheless, Theorem 5 shows that if the
players have a forecasting ability, then only states in D are expected to persist even
when there is the spatial restriction. Therefore, we conclude that under the far-
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sighted player assumption, the set of stationary states that represents an
endogenous balance of power does not change under the spatial restriction.
Theorem 5 also shows that the dominance in expectation selectively reects the
concept of indirect dominancewhich was introduced by Harsanyi (1974) and formal-
ized by Chwe (1994). The indirect dominance concept means that if (w; p) dominates
(w0; p0), with respect to the dominance relation in Denition 4, and (w0; p0) dominates
(w00; p00), then (w; p) indirectly dominates (w00; p00), and so (w00; p00) cannot be a stable
state if (w; p) is a stable state. To see how the dominance in expectation selectively
reects this indirect dominance concept, let (w; p) only indirectly dominate (w00; p00),
that is, (w; p) cannot dominate (w00; p00) at once, and there exists a state that is
dominated by (w; p) and dominates (w00; p00). If there exists a route that connects
from (w00; p00) to (w; p) and through which a winning coalition who prefers (w; p) to
(w00; p00) can achieve (w; p) by pillaging a losing coalition who prefers (w00; p00) to (w; p),
then (w; p) dominate (w00; p00) in expectation. Otherwise, (w; p) does not dominate
(w00; p00) in expectation. Here, the route is a sequence of states in Denition 12 that
satises four conditions above, and the four conditions are su¢ cient conditions to
change a state when the players have a forecasting ability. Therefore, the dominance
in expectation reects the indirect dominance concept if a dominance relation can be
actualized by the players who have a forecasting ability. As a result, this dominance
in expectation designates the set of dyadic states D as the unique set of stationary
states.
In addition, the set D can be considered as a self-enforcing standard of behav-
ior,which is an interpretation about a stable set by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947), in the sense that no state inside D is dominated in expectation by another
state in D and every state outside D is dominated in expectation by some state in D.
Then, we can conclude that in this concept of dominance in expectation, Harsanyis
indirect dominance concept and von Neumann and Morgensterns self-enforcing stan-
dard of behavior concept are combined and constitute a congruous dominance relation
in this spatial pillage game.
Xue (1998) and Konishi and Ray (2003) also introduced solution concepts for a
coalitional game. Their solution concepts, similar to the farsighted core, are dened
based on a reasonable progress of states that shows how the status quo progresses
toward a stationary state under the farsighted player assumption. However, in con-
trast to the farsighted core, their solution concepts focus mainly on the forecasting
ability of a winning coalition, and thus their solution concepts might not capture
the fact that a losing coalition also has the forecasting ability and so they can de-
fend themselves according to their expectation. Therefore, the solution concepts
by Xue and Konishi and Ray might not designate stable states that are considered
as stationary states under the farsighted player assumption. For example, in their
solution concepts, the progress of states ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1))  ! ((3
4
; 0; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1))
 ! ((1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1)) is possible. As a result, the state ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) might not
be a stationary state according to their solution concepts. But, since a losing coalition
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has the forecasting ability, at the state ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)), player 3 will help player 2
in order to deter player 1 from pillaging player 2 in expectation that the second state
((3
4
; 0; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) will proceed to the third state ((1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1)). Accordingly, the
state ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) shows balanced power among the players and therefore must
be considered as a stationary state under the farsighted player assumption as it is
under the farsighted core solution concept.
Finally, Corollary 2 states that denitions about the farsighted core in Jordan
(2006) can be extended to the denitions in this study.
Corollary 2 In one region models, a consistent expectation exists, and it has Kf =
D. Therefore, CS is also D.
Jordan (2006) used one-step expectation, where every state reaches its stationary
state within one step, and one step dominance in expectation, where every plan to
change a state can be completed within one step, and showed the same result as
Corollary 2. Therefore, the denitions in Jordan (2006) can be extended from two
aspects; nite-step expectation, where some states take nite steps to reach their
stationary states, and nite step dominance in expectation, where a plan to change a
state can take more than one step before it ends.
4 Suggestion for further research
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that regions are connected with one another
and thus players can travel from one region to another in one move. The results based
on this assumption are meaningful in that they give general understanding of how
spatial restriction a¤ects stable distribution of wealth. Also, for applications, when
we consider that many countries, which could be regarded as individual regions, are
surrounded by the sea and we can travel from one country to another through the
sea, the assumption seems to be an approximation to reality.
However, in order to describe real situations more exactly, we can design a general
model where some regions are not connected and thus players cannot travel between
these regions in one move. A geography correspondence G embodies the general
models as follows.
Denition 15 A geography correspondence is a correspondence G : R  ! ! R
satisfying for any r 2 R, i) r 2 G(r); ii) if r0 2 G(r) then r 2 G(r0); and iii) there
exists a positive integer k such that Gk(r) = R where Gk(r) = Gk 1(G(r)).
For any r 2 R, G(r) denotes the regions that players at region r can go to in one
move. Condition i) means that players can stay in their regions. Condition ii) means
that connections between two regions are bilateral. And condition iii) means that
there is no separated region where players cannot travel. For example, we can dene
G as G(1) = f1; 2g, G(2) = f1; 2; 3g, and G(3) = f2; 3g, then G describes that three
regions are located along a line.
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